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BIANNUAL SURVEY
only prevented the abatement of the action, but also precluded
the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner (receiver) from suing
to recover the assets of the defendant in New York (the bond).
Thus, the decision appears to be in accord with the underlying
philosophy of the UILA.
ARTICLE 12-INFANTS AND INCOMPETENTS
Preference given to nominee of the relatives of incompetent
when appointing a committee.
In a recent case, the appellate division, first department, 23
modified the decision of the lower court which had granted a
petition for the appointment of a committee for an incompetent.
The appellate court removed the court-designated committee and
replaced her with the committee which had been recommended to
the lower court by the relatives of the incompetent. The mod-
ification was based upon the fact that the two nominees (the one
proposed by the relatives and the one appointed by the court)
appeared to be equally acceptable, and, therefore, the one nominated
by the relatives should have prevailed.
The court's ruling is in accord with prior law. The fourth
department stated the rule well when it held that "consanguinity
is considered . . . in the selection of a committee . . . and will
not be disregarded except upon valid grounds." 124
This rule appears to be in the best interests of the incompetent.
Since it thus helps to fulfill the primary purpose for which com-
mittees are appointed, courts should not be loath to remove
the court-appointed committee if there appears to be no sub-
stantial objection to the committee preferred by the incompetent's
next of kin.125
ARTICLE 14- ACTIONS BETWEEN JOINT TORT-FEASORS
CPLR does not specify when motion for contribution
may be made.
Contribution among joint tort-feasors is dealt with in Sections
1401 and 1402 of the CPLR. These sections provide the "how"
and "why" of bringing an action for contribution, but do not
specify "when" the action may be commenced.
123 jn re Beatty, 21 App. Div. 2d 969, 252 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ist Dep't
1964).
1241In re West, 13 App. Div. 2d 599, 600, 212 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (3d
Dep't 1961). For additional cases in support of this point, see those cited
in West at 600, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
125 The appointment of a committee, formally governed by CPA §§ 1356-
84, is now governed by N.Y. MENTAL HYGiENE LAW §§ 100-13.
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In Stern v. Yasuna,1 26 Satozky, one of the co-defendant tort-
feasors, paid the entire judgment after the appellate division had
affirmed the liability of all the defendants. Two of the joint
tort-feasors received permission to appeal to the court of appeals.
While this appeal was still pending, co-defendant Satozky made
his motion for contribution, which the court granted.
A prior case (apparently the only one in point) in the New
York City Civil Court' 27 had held that the co-defendant was
required to await the outcome of the final appeal before seeking
contribution. The court reasoned that had the legislature intended
to permit the motion immediately, it would have been specifically
provided for in the statute.
The court in the instant case concluded that the "movant is
clearly entitled to the contribution," and added that the other
defendants might apply to an appellate tribunal for the stay denied
them at the trial level.
The practitioner must be aware that this area is still unsettled.
The two lower courts each interpreted the legislature's failure to
provide the "when" as they felt it should be interpreted. The
sections are susceptible to either interpretation.
It is submitted that the reasoning in Stern seems sound, inas-
much as the defendants do have a remedy under CPLR 5519
to stay the enforcement of the judgment.
ARTICLE 20- MISTAKES, DEFECTS, IRREGULARITIES AND
EXTENSIONS OF TIME
Opening of a default under CPLR 2004.
In a recent case 1 8 involving a tort action against the City
of New York, the plaintiff appealed from an order which granted
defendant-city's motion to compel plaintiff to accept a tardy
answer. The supreme court, appellate division, affirmed the order,
but denied the imposition of costs against plaintiff.
Under CPLR 2004 the court in its discretion may extend
the time in which pleadings are required to be served, even
though the application for the extension is made after the expiration
of the statutory period, and is thus, in effect, an application to
open a default. Under this section the applicant must show
"good cause" why he cannot, or could not, comply with the
applicable time requirement. The court stated that in view of
the nature of this tort action, it must have been apparent to the
plaintiff's counsel that the City was not deliberately defaulting,
12844 Misc. 2d 185, 253 N.Y.S2d 439 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
127 Salvatore v. City of New York, 184 Misc. 823, 55 N.Y.S2d 463
(Civ. Ct. 1945).
128 Bermudez v. City of New York, 22 App. Div. 2d 865, 254 N.Y.S2d
420 (1st Dep't 1964).
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